Category: Uncategorized (page 1 of 6)

What does the Sunrise buyout mean for TL and the pipeline?

October 25, 2018 / timorsetl / Comments Off

Buying part of Greater Sunrise from ConocoPhillips
What does it mean for Timor-Leste and the Pipeline?

Analysis by La’o Hamutuk, 4 October 2018.

Last week, negotiators from the Timor-Leste government and the ConocoPhillips international oil company agreed that Timor-Leste will purchase ConocoPhillips’ share in the Joint Venture (consortium or JV) of four oil companies who hold the contract to develop the Greater Sunrise oil and gas field. By paying $350 million, Timor-Leste will become the owner of 30% of this project, together with Woodside (33%), Shell (27%) and Osaka Gas (10%). If the sale goes through, TimorGAP, as Timor-Leste’s national oil company, will participate in making decisions about the project, be responsible to contribute 30% of the investment, and be entitled to 30% of the profit.

This article will address some confusion and misinformation that is circulating in Timor-Leste and international media about the purchase and the Sunrise project. La’o Hamutuk has followed this issue for many years (we published the book Sunrise LNG in Timor-Leste: Dreams, Realities and Challenges in 2008), and we continue to encourage fact-based, objective decisions to serve the best interests of Timor-Leste’s people. We hope that this article will help you understand legal, economic, social and environmental aspects of the project, which has the potential to bring significant benefits or huge losses to our people. Decisions should not be primarily motivated by “winning” a pipeline or overcoming the opinions of countries and companies, but by what will give the most benefit to Timor-Leste’s people over the long term.

Background

The Greater Sunrise undersea gas and oil field was discovered in 1974, but it has not yet been developed because of the Indonesian occupation, the (recently resolved) maritime boundary dispute with Australia, and disagreement about where the gas should be processed. Some analysts estimate that its gas and oil will sell for about $50 billion. After paying for capital investment, operating costs and company profit, this could generate $8-20 billion in tax and royalty revenue to Timor-Leste. If Timor-Leste becomes a part-owner, we will share in the profits, as well as in the responsibility for investment.

For many years, Sunrise has been stalled because Timor-Leste’s government has insisted that its natural gas be piped to Timor-Leste, where it will be cooled until it becomes a liquid (Liquefied Natural Gas – LNG) that can be loaded onto tanker ships and sold to overseas customers.

However, the four oil companies in the Joint Venture believe that other ways of making LNG – either through a pipeline to Australia (Darwin LNG or DLNG) or on a floating platform above the field (FLNG) – will be more profitable and less risky. Timor-Leste’s government believes that spinoff jobs, contracts and local economic development on the Tasi Mane coast will more than compensate for the higher costs and risks of bringing the gas here, but this view is not shared by Australia, the Sunrise Joint Venture, or the UN Conciliation Commission that facilitated the Boundary Treaty. La’o Hamutuk and experts we have consulted are not convinced that the benefits to Timor-Leste are greater than the costs, and we have repeatedly asked the managers of the project for the assumptions and data that make them so optimistic.

Last March, Timor-Leste and Australia signed an historic Treaty to establish their maritime boundary, and it is pending ratification in both countries. La’o Hamutuk celebrates this achievement as a significant advance for Timor-Leste’s national sovereignty. Although the negotiators had hoped to resolve the Sunrise question before the Treaty was signed, they were unable to. Because Sunrise straddles the boundary established by the new treaty, Timor-Leste will receive 70% of the government revenues for extracting Sunrise oil and gas if the gas is processed in Timor-Leste, and 80% if it is processed in Australia.

Buying out ConocoPhillips

Timor-Leste’s purchase of ConocoPhillips’ 30% share of Greater Sunrise is one step in a long process which may eventually bring a gas pipeline from the Sunrise field to Beacu on the south coast. Many Timorese citizens are proud of our political leaders for persuading or paying Australia and the oil companies to accept this position. However, this issue has financial, economic, environmental and social consequences which could affect people’s lives for many generations, and will be longer-lasting and more consequential than temporary patriotic emotion. It is not yet clear that the Sunrise pipeline will be good for the people of Timor-Leste.

The nation needs and deserves a detailed, objective analysis, with complete public information, about the costs, benefits, risks, and impacts of the entire Greater Sunrise and Tasi Mane projects before billions of dollars of public funds are disbursed to oil companies, contractors, brokers and other individuals and companies who don’t have any long-term commitment to the nation or obligation to serve the public interest.

La’o Hamutuk has serious doubts that such an analysis will prove that the benefits of bringing the Sunrise pipeline to Timor-Leste are enough to justify its huge costs, risks and social impacts. But even if it does, the recent agreement to purchase ConocoPhillips’ 30% share is insufficient to ensure that the pipeline will come here.

What else has to happen to bring the pipeline to Timor-Leste?

1. Under the Sunrise Joint Venture rules, each other partner – Woodside, Shell, or Osaka Gas – has the right to “pre-empt” another buyer. In other words, if ConocoPhillips intends to sell its 30% share, one of these companies could purchase it to prevent it from going to someone else. Media reports indicate that Woodside may exercise this power, which would prevent Timor-Leste from buying the share from ConocoPhillips.
2. Australian and Timor-Leste government regulators will have to approve the purchase. The sales contract and Joint Venture agreement must also be approved by the Council of Ministers and reviewed by the Audit Court.

3. Timor-Leste will have to pay $350 million to ConocoPhillips early next year, sort of a down payment on much larger financial obligations in the future (see #5 below). The $350 million – more than twice as much as Timor-Leste spends each year to educate our children – will be taken out of the Petroleum Fund, probably as part of the 2019 State Budget which the Government will propose to Parliament in November. We hope that Parliament’s debate on the Budget will fully explore this issue, including financial and other obligations that Timor-Leste assumes by joining the Joint Venture.

4. Even after Timor-Leste owns a 30% share of Greater Sunrise, it will need to persuade Shell and Woodside to approve a pipeline to Timor-Leste, which may reduce the profitability of the project. Most Joint Ventures require unanimous approval for a major decision like this one. ConocoPhillips wanted to process the gas in Darwin, perhaps because it is the principal owner of the soon-to-be-idle LNG plant there that has been processing gas from Bayu-Undan. They persuaded Shell and Woodside to support their position. Before that, the Joint Venture had preferred Floating LNG; Timor LNG was always the third choice for all the partners.

Without ConocoPhillips, the Sunrise JV will have less financial resources and technical and administrative expertise, and other partners may ask for compensation to accept the increased cost and technical and security risks of a deep-water pipeline to a new LNG plant in Beacu, as well as the additional infrastructure and regulatory support that it will require.
Potential buyers for the LNG will also have to approve the development option and will want assurance that the price, continuity of supply, and security of operation meet their needs.

5. Timor-Leste will need to pay at least 30% of the capital cost to develop the Sunrise field, which will be several billion dollars. This investment is not only for the pipeline and LNG plant, but for drilling exploratory and production wells, building the infrastructure to process oil and gas at the field (probably including a Floating Production Storage and Offloading (FPSO) vessel to store and sell oil from Sunrise), operational infrastructure, and other costs. If this money is borrowed, Timor-Leste will have to pay it back with interest. Although everyone hopes that this investment can be recovered a few years after the field starts production in 6-12 years, the money will need to be paid up front, and recovery is not certain.

6. After the partners and governments agree and the capital investment financing has been secured, the Joint Venture has to design and build the project, subject to regulatory and environmental approval and best practice.

Safeguards

The oil and gas industry has caused pollution, spills, accidents, fires and explosions all over the world, and we need to take appropriate measures to protect our beloved country. Nothing anywhere near this scale has ever been built in Timor-Leste, and virtually nobody here has ever experienced the potential environmental disasters it comes with.

Our regulatory agencies and environmental authorities do not yet have the knowledge, understanding, or perspective to manage a project like this, and they often find it difficult to stand up to political pressure. Although this scientific and administrative capacity could be developed over time – with support from people who have already had major responsibilities on similar projects – the learning curve is long and the consequences of mistakes are huge. “Learning by doing” is not acceptable when billions of dollars and thousands of lives are at risk.

The oil industry is secretive by nature, and projects of this magnitude all over the globe, involving payments of hundreds of millions of dollars to dozens of entities, are often riddled with corruption. After Timor-Leste becomes an owner of Sunrise, our country and our money will be a magnet for thieves and scammers who want a piece of the action, and we may end up paying much more than we should or expect to. With a project of this size and complexity, Timor-Leste needs to implement transparency, oversight, accountability, and checks and balances all along the way. We do not yet have the necessary safeguards in place, and we need to develop them immediately.

Conclusion

In summary, everyone in Timor-Leste needs to be certain that this long journey is one which will lead to a good place. Timor-Leste has already spent about $250 million on the Tasi Mane project, mostly for Suai airport and the Suai-Fatukai highway. We are about to spend $350 million more to buy into Greater Sunrise, to be followed by several billion to prepare to extract its oil and gas. We may spend another $5-$10 billion to build the rest of the Tasi Mane project.

In other words, the country will spend most of our $17 billion Petroleum Fund – which finances education, health care, roads, water, electricity, veterans, PNTL, F-FDTL and many other things – to pursue the gas from Greater Sunrise. It is not too late to seriously consider its costs and benefits, and to see if the petroleum path is the most promising, practical and productive way to use the nation’s finite economic resources. Should we invest our time, money, political capital and administrative skills in the Sunrise and Tasi Mane projects – or should we take the more certain, less dangerous path of diversifying our economy, building on our human and agricultural resources?

If we make the wrong decision now, it will be even harder to change course in the future, and we may continue to throw good money after bad.

[The online version has titles and links to several articles and press releases.]

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From https://laohamutuk.blogspot.com/2018/10/buying-part-of-greater-sunrise-from.html , which has graphics and links, including to many media articles.
La’o Hamutuk
Rua D. Alberto Ricardo, Bebora, Dili, Timor-Leste
Telephone: +670-3321040 or +670-7723-4330
email: laohamutuk@gmail.com
http://www.laohamutuk.org blog: http://laohamutuk.blogspot.com/

Why The Trial Of ‘Witness K’ And Bernard Collaery Should Concern All Australians

September 23, 2018 / timorsetl / Comments Off

https://newmatilda.com/2018/09/21/trial-witness-k-bernard-collaery-concern-australians/

Protestors in Canberra gather in support of ‘Witness K’ and Bernard Collaery, being prosecuted by the Commonwealth for seeking to expose its spying on East Timor.

Why The Trial Of ‘Witness K’ And Bernard Collaery Should Concern All Australians

By Madeleine Miller onSeptember 21, 2018
Australian Politics

If the conduct of the Commonwealth government in the scandal surrounding the bugging of Timor-Leste’s embassy is anything to go by, Australia’s democracy might not be as robust as we think, writes Madeleine Miller.

At a conference in Sydney on the 19^thof August, silk and President of the International Law Association, Christopher Ward invited the Attorney General, Christian Porter to speak to a room of over 100 distinguished international lawyers from across the world. The subject was the rule of law.

As the leadership spill ensued, Porter sent shadow minister for finance, David Coleman, to read his speech. Through Coleman, the Attorney General spoke of the gravity of his role as carrying “a great privilege and fundamental responsibility” and the rule of law as “crucial in promoting stability, ensuring everyone is equal before the law… and a pillar upon which our engagement abroad rests.”

According to Porter, “Australia’s firm commitment to the rule of law is no better illustrated than through the historic maritime boundary treaty that we signed in March this year.”

In a somewhat ironic twist, ILA President, Christopher Ward emerged at the ACT Magistrates Court last Wednesday as Bernard Collaery’s legal representation. Collaery is the lawyer for Witness K, a former Australian Security Intelligence Service (ASIS) official discharged after questioning the authority of ASIS to send spies posing as foreign aid workers to plant listening devices in Timor Leste’s cabinet room during oil negotiations with Australia in 2004.

The person responsible for authorising the charges against Collaery and Witness K was the Attorney General, Christian Porter.

While the media has been fixated on the spitfire between Peter Dutton, Roman Quaedvlieg and au pairs, this case which speaks volumes about ministerial integrity and anti-corruption is sailing under the radar for most Australians. Labor’s dirty hands in this decade long shame, is pushing this case to the deathly silence of the sea floor. This trial should be at the surface, generating waves and rocking Australia out of complacency.

This case is not simply about whistleblower protection (Collaery argues that it is not about whistleblowers at all) – but cuts much deeper to the integrity of our democratic system.

It exposes the significant deficiencies in the protection of the rule of law in Australia which cannot be whitewashed by glossy tales of treaty signing with Timor-Leste, after decades of playing dirty.

It is fitting that this case appeared before a Magistrate around the anniversary of 9/11. Since 9/11, Australia has introduced over 60 pieces of federal counter terrorism legislation. This deluge of national security legislation has eroded significant aspects of the rule of law, and Bernard Collaery and Witness K have become examples of what can be caught in the trawler net of counter terrorism legislation.

What is the rule of law?

The rule of law is the foundation of our democratic system, but you won’t find it mentioned in the constitution. It is an inference. In its most basic form, it means that we are subject to laws created by our elected representatives, but so are our elected representatives; everyone is equal before the law.

However, the steadfast understanding of the rule of law is that equality before the law depends upon checks and balances on the use of power, freedom of speech, transparency and access to confidential legal advice.

What the prosecution of Collaery and Witness K illustrates is that our intelligence agencies are not equally accountable for breaking the law, and that political revenge can be the catalyst for bringing a proceeding before the court.

Equality before the law

While charges have been laid against Collaery and his client, the Australian Federal Police, to our knowledge, have not investigated the alleged unlawful activity of ASIS in the bugging of Timor Leste’s cabinet, despite a request from Independent MP Andrew Wilkie, Centre Alliance MP Rex Patrick, and Greens Senator Nick McKim.

Surely it is a question of significant public interest whether or not espionage for oil companies in a commercial negotiation on a poor foreign neighbor is a ‘proper purpose’ for our intelligence agencies under our domestic law?

Attorney General

The Attorney-General is a gatekeeper of the rule of law, tasked with promoting, preserving and protecting it. The Attorney General has the power to initiate and end criminal proceedings. However, the role of Attorney General is inherently frustrated by the fact that they are also an elected politician, who is answerable to his or her party.

Whether prosecuting is in the ‘public interest’ is a juggling act of perceived independence and keeping your party afloat. Only with significant public pressure can the integrity of this role be upheld.

Attorney General Christian Porter, pictured on ABC’s Q&A program.

With Labor keeping its mouth shut about this case (except of MP Julian Hill who denounced the charges on Tuesday), the Attorney General’s decision to prosecute Collaery and Witness K in the ‘public interest’ has been left largely unchallenged. Porter has made no public statement to clarify how he concluded that the prosecution is in the public interest.

IGIS

The Inspector General of Intelligence Services is an office tasked with ensuring that our intelligence agencies “act legally and with propriety, comply with ministerial guidelines and directives and respect human rights.”

However, the power of this watchdog is undermined by the requirement that the IGIS report to the minister. The function of the IGIS presumes that the Minister was not involved in the wrongdoing. There is also a cognisable issue with independence as it is situated within the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet.

Collaery has claimed that his client went to the IGIS to report the unlawful bugging of Timor Leste’s cabinet and was given approval to seek legal advice. It is alleged his employment was then terminated. The IGIS has subsequently denied being approached by Witness K.

Questions remain to be answered who knew about the alleged bugged operation and who delivered the direction.

Public Service’s whistleblower laws

The Public Interest Disclosure Act, the federal whistleblower protection law, excises intelligence officials from the ambit of its protection, and does not protect those who blow the whistle on wrongdoing by politicians.

Absence of a federal integrity commission

Two men who were extensively involved in the Timor Sea issue at the time Timor-Leste’s cabinet was bugged – Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, and the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Ashton Calvert – have both gone on to take up positions at Woodside, the primary beneficiary of the oil in the Timor Sea.

Former Labor Ministers for Energy and Resources, Gary Gray and Martin Ferguson, have also both gone on to roles associated with Woodside.

The integrity of Ministerial decisions is further muddied by the fact that Woodside has donated over $1.4 million to the major parties over the last decade.

In the absence of a federal integrity commission, the integrity of ministerial decision-making will continue to be one of doubt, and little consequence.

Senate oversight

Unlike the United States, the Australian Senate and the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security has very little oversight over the work of our intelligence agencies beyond administration and finance.

International Law

Australia is not ‘bound’ by international law. When Australia signs an international treaty, it does not automatically become law in Australia. This is unlike many countries throughout the world, including the United States where it automatically becomes domestic law without the need for legislation. Although international law may inform Australian courts’ interpretation in some circumstances where there is ambiguity, that is the extent of it.

A core tenet of international law on treaties (in which Australia is a signatory) is negotiation in good faith. Spying in the circumstances Australia did was an abject breach.

Anticipating independence was imminent, two months before the vote Australia withdrew from the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and rejected the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal of the Law of Sea.

Human Rights

Unlike most democracies, Australia does not have a human rights charter, and limited protection of human rights in the constitution. Only two Australian states have human rights bills. No piece of Australian law lays out the rights attaching to Australian citizenship. Collaery and Witness K’s case will be a real test of the fallibility of Australian human rights protections.

Right to Free speech

Both Collaery and Witness K face charges under the Intelligence Services Act, for communicating information about ASIS – Witness K as a former ASIS official, and Collaery as someone who has a contract or agreement with ASIS.

However, Collaery has been at pains to point out to the media, Witness K did not ‘blow the whistle.’ The only communication he engaged in was with his lawyer, and he was intending to give evidence at the private proceedings of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, and not to the public.

As Witness K’s lawyer, Collaery is arguing he was and is not under any contractual agreement with ASIS. As a lawyer he owes a duty foremost to the court and to serve the best interests of his client.

Intending to push on with the publishing of his book about Australia and Timor Leste in January next year, Collaery is turning up the dial of his fight against the dilution of freedom of speech by counter terrorism laws.

Client legal privilege

The confidentiality of communication between a lawyer and his client however, is a very well-established principle of the rule of law and is seen as essential to the justice system. Yet, in the name of “national security”, ASIO bugged Collaery’s office and Witness K’s home and conducted raids in 2013, signed off by the Attorney General and not the court.

Collaery argues this would never have been signed off by judicial officer, for the legal profession is underpinned by client legal privilege (confidential communication between lawyer and client). Intercepting this communication is considered a miscarriage of justice and the jeopardization of a right to a fair trial.

The International Permanent Court of Arbitration agreed and ordered the Australian government to return all of the seized material to Collaery.

Right to a public trial

“National security” was the focus of the directions hearing, with the prosecution determined for the case to be heard behind closed doors. The right to a trial to be heard in public, is another well-established principle of the law that counter terrorism legislation may have again usurped.

At his last appearance before the media on 12 July, Collaery pleaded to the media that they are the soul of justice.

How the court will preside this case is of huge significance to all Australians. It may just expose that our foundations as a free and democratic society are not as fortified as we think.

Collaery and Witness K’s case will next be heard on 29 October at 9am at the ACT Magistrates Court.

Australia’s prosecution of spy Witness K and lawyer

July 22, 2018 / timorsetl / Comments Off

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/22/timor-leste-activists-shocked-by-australias-prosecution-of-spy-witness-k-and-lawyer

The Guardian

Timor-Leste

Timor-Leste activists ‘shocked’ by Australia’s prosecution of spy Witness K and lawyer

Activists compare treatment of Australian spy and lawyer Bernard Collaery to acts of Suharto-led Indonesia breach section 39 of the Intelligence Services Act.

Timor-Leste activists have condemned the Australian government over the prosecution of Witness K and lawyer Bernard Collaery for their roles in revealing the bugging of the Timor-Leste cabinet during negotiations on an oil and gas treaty.

The activists from the Movement Against the Occupation of the Timor Sea (MKOTT) have joined mounting criticism of the prosecution, comparing the act to the targeting they and their family experienced under the rule of the Suharto-led Indonesian government.

“Ironically, these Timorese were charged as terrorists by the Indonesian government and today Mr Bernard Collaery and Witness K are charged with the anti-terror law by the Australian attorney general, their very own government,” MKOTT said on Friday.

Witness K scandal: decision to charge Timor-Leste bugging whistleblower was ‘independent’

“MKOTT is shocked that, in this day and age, the Australian government is doing what it thinks only the dictator Suharto was capable of doing during his reign.”

The Australian intelligence officer known as Witness K and his solicitor, Collaery, are facing charges of conspiring to breach section 39 of the Intelligence Services Act, following the revelations in 2012 that Australian spies had bugged the room of Timorese negotiators during sensitive talks in 2004 about an oil and gas treaty between the two countries.

A summons alleges Witness K unlawfully communicated intelligence secrets to Collaery, who then allegedly communicated them to a number of ABC journalists.

The News Corp journalist who first broke the bugging story, Leo Shanahan, is not named in the summons.

The first directions hearing is scheduled for Wednesday in Canberra.

Timor-Leste took Australia to the permanent court of arbitration at The Hague, with Witness K prepared to be a key witness, however he was prevented from leaving Australia when his passport was seized in 2012.

In 2013 Collaery’s office was raided by Asio officers and documents seized in what Collaery alleged was an attempt to “muzzle” him. The then attorney general, George Brandis, said the Asio search warrants were issued “to protect Australia?s national security”.

MKOTT condemned the charges as “politically motivated” and an attack by the Australian government on democracy and freedom of expression.

“This act on the part of the Australian government also shows that the government will use anything to pursue Australia?s commercial interests in relations with its neighbours, even if it violates international law to deprive one of its poorest neighbour, and will crash anyone or anything stands on its way.”

Witness K: ex-judge condemns prosecution of Timor-Leste bugging whistleblower

Australia’s fractious negotiations with Timor-Leste over the lucrative oil and gas reserves in the seas between the two countries has stretched for decades, intertwined with the Indonesian occupation of the tiny nation and marred by hostilities and accusations.

The case at The Hague was subsequently dropped as an act of good faith and the two countries have since signed a treaty delimiting a maritime border that largely determines the split of oil and gas reserves.

The final division depends on whether the processing occurs in Timor-Leste or Darwin. Timor-Leste has build a processing plant in anticipation but oil and gas companies have flagged a preference for Darwin to avoid having to pipe across the Timor Trench.

The treaty split also prompted criticism of Australia?s decades long claim over resources it has since exhausted but now acknowledges, via the treaty, had belonged to Timor-Leste all along.

The prosecutions of Witness K and Collaery were revealed under parliamentary privilege by the Tasmanian MP Andrew Wilkie, and the Australian attorney general, Christian Porter, subsequently confirmed he had approved them, but refused to elaborate on why.

When asked at the time why the perpetrators of the act were not being prosecuted instead, Porter replied he did not understand the question.

?I am not the prosecutor, nor is the government the prosecutor,? Porter said. ?I am not the judge nor the jury in this matter, and nor is the government.?

Porter’s office declined to comment further and directed Guardian Australia to his previous comments.

Timor-Leste bugging Australia’s Watergate except Nixon wins

July 7, 2018 / timorsetl / Comments Off

https://www.crikey.com.au/2018/07/06/timor-leste-bugging-was-our-watergate/

Crikey
Federal Jul 6, 2018

Timor-Leste bugging was our Watergate except in this version, Nixon wins

Neither Labor nor News Corp are interested in one of the greatest scandals and cover-ups of recent Australian history, the bugging of Timor-Leste.

Bernard Keane

Politics editor

Imagine Watergate if the Democrats, and many Republicans, had never been interested in pursuing it. And if the American media not justThe Washington Post, but the many other newspapers that began putting more and more resources into the story despite Nixon’s cover-up hadn’t bothered. Well, there wouldn’t be any Watergate. Nixon would have served out his full two terms and retired as the elder statesman of post-war politics. The break-in at the Democrat headquarters on June 17, 1972, would be a piece of political trivia about one of the worst Democratic campaigns in history, and nothing more.

The Howard government’s bugging of the Timor-Leste cabinet in 2004 is the Watergate of Australian politics, a crime committed by a pack of bullies who believed themselves above the law, not against a rival political organisation that was capable of fighting back through the political system, but a struggling, deeply impoverished neighbour. A crime that has been covered up ever since through a combination of lies, refusals to discuss the issue, harassment and intimidation and, now, a vexatious political prosecution of Witness K and Bernard Collaery. Only, in this version of Watergate, the political opposition is entirely uninterested in either the crime or the cover-up, and refuses to do anything about either. Bob Carr and Mark Dreyfus lied about the issue in 2013, perpetuating the cover-up. You can watch Tanya Plibersek twisting and turning to avoid commenting in 2016. “Don’t you want to know? Do you want to know what the answer to this?” Tony Jones asked Plibersek about it. Apparently not.

Some parts of the media have been better: Fairfax, the ABC and TheGuardian have all carried a number of articles of reportage, comment and analysis of the prosecution of K and Collaery in the last week, particularly concerning a number of figures who have criticised the prosecution. The ABC, of course, prominently covered the issue in 2013 and 2014, and its journalists and producers are named in the prosecution documents as being the people Collaery communicated information to. But one noticeable absentee from coverage of the prosecution is News Corp outlets. News.com.au and the News Corp tabloids have had no coverage of the prosecution at all; The Australian had one article covering the prosecution, and a brief mention in “Strewth”. Otherwise, the issue has received no coverage whatsoever from the Murdoch press.

Which, given it was The Australian‘s yarn, given Leo Shanahan broke the story on May 29, 2013, is rather peculiar. Normally the Oz and its tabloid cousins are eager to remind us that they had the scoop, and that everyone else in the media is just playing catch-up. Why the studied silence over K and Collaery? Oh, that’s right, the government decided to omit News Corp from the prosecution documents. Only ABC staff will have to give evidence, and perhaps have their conversations with Collaery played in court. Not Shanahan. And one News Corp commentator, Niki Savva, actually tried to justify the prosecution on Insiders last week.

Clearly the Turnbull government didn’t want to risk News Corp firing up over the prosecution by including one of its journalists. It wants K and Collaery prosecuted in camera, as quietly as possible, with minimal coverage, to punish them for exposing both the crime and cover-up, and to signal to anyone else who might be in a position to embarrass them that they’re next only now the penalty is a decade in jail, (thank you George Brandis) not the two years Collaery and K face. So it’s keeping News Corp onside, and so far News Corp is complying.

The cover-up continues right before our eyes.

Ties between Timor-Leste and Australia hit turbulence

July 2, 2018 / timorsetl / Comments Off

https://www.ucanews.com/news/ties-between-timor-leste-and-australia-hit-turbulence/82701

News » Social justice » Timor Leste

Ties between Timor-Leste and Australia hit turbulence

Men who exposed Australia for spying on the Timor-Leste Cabinet during 2004 bilateral gas talks now face jail

Michael Sainsbury and Jose Belo, Dili
Timor Leste June 29, 2018

Timor-Leste’s new government has hit a major hurdle in its plan to improve fraught relations with Australia over the sensitive issue of maritime boundaries in the gas-rich sea between the two countries.

It was only in March that Australia and Timor-Leste, formerly known as East Timor, signed a treaty drawing permanent maritime boundaries.

Ties have been improving since, but now the legacy Australian spying 14 years ago has come to the fore.

The Australian spy agency “whistleblower” known as Witness K and his Canberra-based lawyer, Bernard Collaery, a veteran advisor to Timor-Leste, were on June 28 committed for trial on criminal charges that could see them both jailed.

They are accused of illegally informing the Timor-Leste government that Australia had been spying on them by using Cabinet room listening devices installed on the authority of then foreign minister Alexander Downer.

This was while crucial talks were being conducted on the sharing of maritime oil and gas reserves.

“Witness K was not a whistleblower,” Callaeary said previously. “He went with his complaint to the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security and received approval, and I received approval to act.”

Collaery said that the prosecution was a “vindictive” attack that aimed at ruining his reputation and career, according to The Australian.

“It’s an attack on myself for acting as a lawyer within my professional rules and it’s a sad moment in the history of the country I love and have served,” he said.

Privately the Timorese government is saying little, but Colleary is extremely close to Timor-Leste leaders such as Prime Minister Taur Matan Ruak and Xanana Gusmao.

The prosecution by Australia could stymie ongoing talks between Timor and Australia on the thorny issue of whether piped gas from the US$50 billion Great Sunrise gas field lands in Timor-Leste or Australia for processing.

Xanana Gusmao, head of the ruling Alliance for Progress and Change (but not prime minister), is continuing to press for a Timor-Leste facility, despite energy companies claiming such a move is uneconomic and could lead to them not exploiting the fields.

People close to the new Timor PM have said he is very keen to have much closer engagement with Australia. No minister in Australia’s ruling conservative government has visited the country since its election in 2013.

Timor-Leste’s Foreign Minister Dionisio Babo told ucanews.com that the relationship with Australia had improved in recent years under Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull and Foreign Minister Julie Bishop.

This was during renegotiation of an earlier the maritime treaty, which was torn up by a U.N. court forcing Australia into negotiations. Colleary ran the court case in The Hague for Timor-Leste.

Babo remained mute over the trial committal decision of June 28: “I will not comment, it is a matter for the Australian legal system.”

A spokesperson for the Australian government said planning was underway for Julie Bishop to visit Timor-Leste

ANZ Timor Leste abandons retail customers

June 26, 2018 / timorsetl / Comments Off

https://media.anz.com/posts/2018/06/timor-customer-questions?pid=per-hb-18june-important-information

June 18, 2018

Timor-Leste customer FAQs

Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited Timor-Leste Branch (ANZ) announced that we will focus on our Commercial banking business and as a result, close our Retail banking products and services in Timor-Leste.

By becoming a simpler bank with one clear focus on commercial banking, we can provide better service to our Commercial customers, by investing our effort and resources in the business.

We remain committed to Timor-Leste where we’ve had a presence since 2001 and we will continue to provide international products to service the region’s commercial customers, with a focus on trade and global markets.

Banku ANZ (Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited), fó-hatene katak sei tau matan de’it ba servisu bankáriu sira iha área komersiál, tamba ida-ne, ANZ sei hapara servisu kona-ba produtu no servisu retallu nian iha Timor-Leste.

Hodi simplifika ami nia atensaun ba servisu bankáriu iha área komersiál, ami bele fo servisu nebe diak liu ba klienti komersiál sira, liu husi investa ami nia esforsu no rekursu atu atende sira.

Ami hahú hala’o servisu iha Timor-Leste husi 2001 no sei hatutan nafatin servisu iha ne’e maibé sei hare’e liuliu ba produtu internasionál sira ne’ebé hatán liuliu ba nesesidade Kliente komersiál sira-nian iha rejiaun ida ne’e. Ami tulun Kliente sira atu hatan di’ak liu ba negósiu no harii ligasaun di’ak liu ho merkadu mundiál.

—

What happens to all of ANZ’s Retail customers?

We will close our Retail products and services in Timor-Leste on Friday 28 September 2018.

Retail customers are advised to make arrangements to close their banking accounts with ANZ Timor by 21 September 2018.

I’m a Commercial customer. Where can I carry out my cash and cheque deposits and withdrawals?

Commercial customers can continue to visit us at the ANZ Service Counter for cash and counter services.

The ANZ branch in Timor Plaza will continue to be open Monday to Friday: 9.00am – 4.00pm (except for public holidays). The branch will offer Commercial customers:

Cash deposits
Cash withdrawals
Cheque deposits
Document verification / certification
Account opening
Submission and collection of trade documents

Will there be changes to ANZ’s banking fees and charges?

No, there will be not any changes to our Commercial Banking fees and charges as a result of the closure of our Retail products and services.

Why did ANZ close its Retail banking products and services? What will happen to ANZ’s Commercial business?

We have decided to close our Retail products and services on 28 September to concentrate our efforts where we know we can make an even stronger impact on the prosperity of our customers and the community here – and that’s through our Commercial business.

ANZ remains committed to Timor-Leste, where we’ve had a presence since 2001. Since then, we’ve witnessed an evolving landscape that now clearly points to a period of progress, and we strongly believe that Timor-Leste is poised to enjoy economic prosperity over the long term. We want to be a part of Timor-Leste’s growth journey and need to position our business for long term prosperity as well.

ANZ is the largest Commercial bank in Timor with a book of USD50m – almost double our nearest competitor. We provide more than $150m of bank guarantees. ANZ remains committed to its commercial presence in Timor-Leste, consistent with our goal to be the best bank in the world for clients driven by trade and capital flows across Asia Pacific. The closure of our Retail products and services allows us to focus and invest resources in our Commercial business to support this goal, and to make us a simpler, stronger, more connected bank with a clear focus.

A Vote for Certainty in Timor-Leste

May 15, 2018 / timorsetl / Comments Off

ttp://insidestory.org.au/in-timor-leste-a-vote-for-certainty/

In Timor-Leste, A Vote for Certainty

Michael Leach

May 14, 2018

After nearly ten months of political uncertainty, Saturday’s parliamentary elections in Timor-Leste delivered a decisive result. The Change for Progress Alliance, or AMP, a coalition of three parties led by Xanana Gusmão, won 49.6 per cent of the national vote, delivering thirty-four out of sixty-five seats and winning a narrow majority in its own right. In Timor’s proportional system, where outright majorities aren’t common, this was a strong vindication of the decision to combine the forces of Gusmão’s CNRT with Taur Matan Ruak’s Popular Liberation Party, or PLP, and the smaller youth-focused party KHUNTO in a formal pre-election coalition.

This was a polarising election. The AMP achieved a swing of 3.1 per cent on their collective 2017 results, though the entry of a new party saw their tally of seats fall by one. Fretilin received 34.2 per cent of the national vote, and twenty-three seats, maintaining its 2017 seat tally. This represented a substantial swing of 4.5 per cent, though it proved insufficient to overcome the formidable AMP coalition, as the swings to both major groupings came at the expense of smaller parties. The result sees Xanana Gusmão back as PM, at least in the initial phase of the new government, ousting the Fretilin–Democratic Party minority government led by Mari Alkatiri. The Democratic Party is also back in parliament with five seats (down from seven in 2017), and a new coalition, the FDD, has three. The AMP government is likely to form a ministry from within its own ranks, though the FDD may well be invited in later.

With many residents back in their home districts to vote, Dili was unusually quiet in the wake of a divisive and heated campaign. Though observers remain alert to the potential for trouble in coming weeks, there seems no immediate prospect of it occurring in the wake of the poll. The campaign and its divisive prelude in 2017 clearly drove the electorate towards the larger players, with 84 per cent voting for the two major blocs and over 97 per cent of the vote going to four parties. The entire electorate seemed to want to ensure their votes would count, and abandoned the parties unlikely to clear the 4 per cent hurdle to win seats. Turnout was a strong 81 per cent, up 5 per cent on last year.

Some results in the districts were significant. Repeating similar patterns since 2007, the AMP won the ten western districts. Of particular interests was the large swing against Fretilin in the district of Oecusse. It was here that Fretilin recorded its only fall in votes in any district. The fact that the party has had sole responsibility for the district’s Special Economic and Social Market Zone project in recent years will no doubt play on the minds of party strategists, and local Fretilin chief Arsenio Bano apologised publicly for the performance to his leader on Saturday night. In Dili and the eastern districts of Viqueque and Baucau, on the other hand, Fretilin performed strongly, gaining large swings.

With an AMP government and a Fretilin president, the next few years will demonstrate what “cohabitation” looks like in Timor-Leste’s semi-presidential system. Given that previous presidents have been independents, this will be a first, and is likely to test the constitutional relationship between president and parliament, and the scope for presidential vetoes of legislation. Some vetoes are reversible by a simple majority in parliament (though vetoes of decree laws issued by the government are irreversible), but reversing certain other vetoes requires a super-majority of two-thirds. These includes legislation in such key areas as “the budget system,” which means the president has the power to veto future budget legislation or refer it to the courts to test its constitutionality a power former presidents Jose Ramos-Horta and Taur Matan Ruak used at different times.

An important difference between Ruak’s veto of the 2015 budget and any potential veto during this parliament is that Ruak was exercising his powers in the era of the de facto national unity government, which meant the government could draw on a supermajority to reverse it. Fretilin’s twenty-three seats in the new parliament means that non-Fretilin forces are one short of the super-majority of forty-three seats.

The political stalemate of the past ten months, and the effective freeze on government spending, have inevitably affected the economy. Given this, insiders believe the president is highly unlikely to veto the first budget, but could, like other presidents before him, do so in future, and with fewer prospects for reversal. This indicates the potential scope of “cohabitation”-related standoffs over the next few years.

With a clear majority, the AMP will now set about forming a new government and passing a much-needed budget. The major question yet to be answered is how the coalition will reconcile the CNRT’s focus on megaproject-led spending with the PLPs focus on basic development spending in health, education and agriculture. On the campaign trial, Gusmão acknowledged “mistakes” by his previous governments and gave the floor to the PLP and KHUNTO leaders to address these issues in rallies a sign he was listening and open to change. Some AMP supporters see this as a second chance for the great resistance leader to consolidate his other legacy as a leader of government. Though his previous governments brought social stability, economic growth and much else, there is a sense that spending on basic development measures has lagged badly, and far too much has been spent on big infrastructure projects.

Election day passed without major incidents, though comments from Gusmão on the day that he “would not accept the result if it was not fair” were unhelpful, and built on a series of complaints from AMP in the campaign which were not backed by strong evidence. In its preliminary report, the largest observer mission referred to the “injudicious and inappropriate language of some political representatives” and noted that allegations about the election process are “serious in character and, if made, need to be supported by evidence.” On Monday, Fretilin raised similar concerns over the vote in Oecusse, again without immediately offering compelling evidence. Timor-Leste’s two electoral agencies again did an excellent job despite the pressure of the re-run campaign and limited budgets.

Saturday’s win for the AMP win was a clear and decisive one, and many in Timor will be relieved at the end of political uncertainty and protracted coalition negotiations. Though some in AMP saw the election as a chance to put Fretilin away for good, and some projected a massive win, the Fretilin vote grew significantly for the first time since the post–crisis election of 2007, demonstrating the impact of new affiliations by independents and, perhaps, new support from elements of the church. Though Fretilin is deeply disappointed by the defeat, it has increased its support base in 2018, and is likely to remain the biggest single party in the country. The AMP may come to see Fretilin’s continuing strength as a reminder of the need for discipline and unity in their three-party coalition, and hence as a positive.

Great challenges lie ahead for the new government, including the need to diversify the economy before the sovereign wealth fund, based on finite oil and gas reserves, depletes somewhere in the late 2020s. In this process, it its clear it will face a strong opposition determined to hold it to account.

MICHAEL LEACH

Michael Leach is Professor of Politics and International Relations at Swinburne University of Technology.

Fund-raiser SETL Sydney

April 8, 2018 / timorsetl / Comments Off

Treaty confirms Aust profited from Timor-Leste oil and gas, rights groups say

March 9, 2018 / timorsetl / Comments Off

Treaty confirms Australia profited from Timor-Leste oil and gas,
rights groups say

The Guardian – March 7, 2018

Helen Davidson and Christopher Knaus — Australia has received
billions of dollars in revenue from contested oil and gas fields
which a new border treaty officially confirms belonged to
Timor-Leste, civil society groups have claimed.

On Wednesday the two nations signed a treaty agreeing a permanent
maritime border to close the Timor Gap, and establishing a “special
regime” area for the sharing of an untapped, multibillion-dollar gas
field in the Timor Sea.

It came at the end of decades of fractious negotiations and
disagreements, which included accusations of greed and espionage on
the part of Australia.

But human rights groups and observers have balked at the treaty’s
division of rights and revenue entitlements to Australia which they
say belong to Timor-Leste, and at provisions which stop Timor-Leste
seeking compensation.

The treaty delimits a permanent north-south border, and two
transitional borders on the east and west.

The eastern transitional border divides Greater Sunrise, and on the
west three fields — Buffalo, Bayu Undan and Kitan — are now fully
in Timorese territory. The nearly-depleted Laminaria-Corallina
remains in Australian waters but could shift.

The treaty suggests the transitional borders will move once Greater
Sunrise on the west and Laminaria-Corallina on the east are depleted,
and once Timor and Indonesia agree to new borders. What agreement
those two nations come to will determine the ownership of the
then-depleted fields.

However, the agreement signed at the United Nations on Wednesday
stipulates “no compensation for past exploitation”.

L’ao Hamutuk, a Timorese human rights group, published calculations
claiming Laminaria-Corallina has produced 203m barrels of oil since
it began production in 1999, with more than US$2.2bn in tax paid to
the Australian government. It estimates Australia received another
$2.4bn in revenue from the other fields.

A Timorese diplomatic source told the Guardian it was unlikely
Timor-Leste wanted to push for compensation, because of Australia’s
generosity during “difficult times”.

“Because Australia has been so generous with Timor in the past, they
will probably not ask for it back, but if Australia wanted to give it
to Timor, then that would be nice.”

Spokesman for the Timor Sea Justice Campaign, Tom Clarke, said
Australian governments had tried to “short-change the Timorese at
every opportunity over the years” and he welcomed the lasting
solution found on the boundaries.

“[A] question is will Australia be paying back any revenue it
received from smaller fields such as Buffalo when it was unilaterally
depleting contested fields that the Timorese have always claimed as theirs?”

“Australia owes Timor billions,” said Kim McGrath, research director
of the Steve Bracks AC Timor-Leste Governance Project and an adviser
to the Timor-Leste government.

McGrath said Australia had come a long way in working with
Timor-Leste, and while she was initially skeptical they would “come
to the party” in the untested conciliation process, she had been proved wrong.

“While I’m not convinced Australia is fair or right, and certainly
I’d question the morality of Australia still grabbing a piece of
Greater Sunrise, it’s still a step forward.”

McGrath said a 2015 decision by the Australian Labor party to
officially support negotiations was a “game changer” as it forced the
foreign affairs department to prepare for it in the event Labor won
the 2016 election.

Bernard Collaery, a lawyer intimately involved in the case, described
the treaty as “more of the same” and said a median line boundary was
“no victory at all”.

It was something Timor-Leste had already been entitled to under
United Nations law of the sea convention since Australia signed it,
Collaery said.

“Australia has been a pickpocket in the Timor Sea, shuffling through
the poverty-stricken garments of these people for years,” Collaery
told Guardian Australia. “And it’s horrible.”

Collaery said former Timor-Leste president Xanana Gusmao, a close
friend of his, was “between a rock and a hard place” with his people,
and “the next generation of Timorese may not be as tolerant as he’s been”.

Professor Clive Schofield, from Woollongong University’s National
Centre for Ocean Resources and Security, disagreed with assessments
that a fairly drawn median line would place Greater Sunrise wholly in
Timor-Leste territory.

He said the border shifts in the lateral boundaries enshrined in the
treaty were “quite innovative” in that they appeared to anticipate
the outcome of Timorese-Indonesian negotiations over their borders on
either side of the Timor Gap.

“Those arguments around the idea that Timor-Leste’s lateral lines
should be much further to the east and west rely on giving less
weight to Indonesian territory,” he said.

Once the treaty is enacted into domestic law the two countries will
continue negotiations about how to split and develop Greater Sunrise.

A letter from Gusmao to the UN conciliation committee, leaked on
Tuesday, accused Australia of colluding with resource companies in
pushing for the gas to be piped to Darwin.

He said giving up 10% of the revenue share in return for a Timorese
processing plant would bring about $25bn in downstream revenue to his country.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/07/treaty-confirms-australia-profited-from-timor-leste-oil-and-gas-rights-groups-say

How Australia crossed a line in the Timor Sea

February 18, 2018 / timorsetl / Comments Off

https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/how-australia-crossed-line-timor-sea

SATURDAY 17 FEB 2018 | 01:35 | SYDNEY

How Australia crossed a line in the Timor Sea

Kim McGrath

The UN Compulsory Conciliation between Australia and Timor-Leste, which aims to set a boundary in the Timor Sea, appears to be inching towards resolution, with details emerging in the Portuguese media last week of a deal involving a median line boundary and a revenue-sharing arrangement for the Greater Sunrise fields.

But the history of this long-standing dispute remains contested. A recent Interpreter article by Hugh Wyndham – former head of the Law of the Sea branch of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) – which discusses Australia’s tactics during the final days of Timor Sea treaty negotiations with Indonesia in 1972, contributes interesting, if narrowly focused, background to the dispute.

Wyndham takes issue with Michael Rose’s review of my book Crossing the Line: Australia’s Secret History in the Timor Sea, arguing that “this commentary … overlooks the context in which the 1972 negotiations with Indonesia took place”. Wyndham’s criticism is curious given his article doesn’t engage with the post-colonial and geo-political contexts of the negotiations, and instead concentrates on the technical details of the last few days of the talks.

Crossing the Line is based on examination of cabinet submissions, cables, briefs, and other declassified documents from a range of departments in the National Archives of Australia. It clearly emerges from the archives that by the early 1970s, Australian officials realised the only way they could confirm the validity of Timor Sea permits unilaterally issued by Australia to major resource companies in the early 1960s was to negotiate seabed boundaries with Indonesia and Portugal.

As Wyndham describes, Australia claimed “continental shelf rights” to the Timor Trough – a deep channel parallel to the coast of Timor, 30–50 nautical miles offshore. But he does not explain the basis of Indonesia’s claim to the median line.

Indonesia argued the trough was a dint in Australia’s continental shelf that extended beneath Timor. International law at the time dictated that where states were on the same continental shelf, the boundary should be the median line.

In the archives I found a declassified report on the geography of the Timor Trough, by the Australian Bureau of Mineral Resources (BMR), which was requested by the DFA ahead of the first round of negotiations with Indonesia in early 1970. The report stated there was no evidence of oceanic crust at the bottom of the Timor Trough – advice that supported Indonesia’s position. Needless to say, the advice was ignored.

Geologists today endorse the view put by the BMR.

The BMR also provided advice that the area north of the median line, opposite Portuguese Timor, was highly prospective for petroleum. But Australia refused to negotiate with Portugal until after a deal was done with Indonesia.

I argue that this strategic decision, which is not explained in the declassified files in the archives, set up the scenario under which, should Portuguese Timor become part of Indonesia, it would be a simple exercise to close the gap in the area between Portuguese Timor and Australia – the Timor Gap – with a ruler, joining the end points of the 1972 treaty. Wyndham insists that such a view was not a “feature in policymaking leading to the 1972 negotiations with Indonesia”.

The declassified records show that in 1963, the same year of Australia’s unilaterally issued Timor Sea permits, the Australian Government accepted that Portuguese Timor would eventually become part of Indonesia. And in 1965, cabinet decided not to negotiate with Portugal about the Timor Sea boundary issue because Australia didn’t want to “imply a degree of acceptance on our part of Portugal’s right to share in decisions permanently affecting the future of the area”.

While cabinet decisions do not bind future governments, this assumption helps contextualise Australia’s refusal of Portugal’s numerous approaches to negotiate a boundary before the 1972 treaty with Indonesia was signed. After the 1972 treaty left the Timor Gap, Australia approached Portugal to close the end points with a straight line. An offer Portugal rejected.

From there, it appears Australia considered Portuguese Timor becoming part of Indonesia as a potential way to close the gap. A November 1973 DFA brief makes clear that “control of Portuguese Timor passing to Indonesia” was a possibility, and that DFA expected that if that happened Indonesia would agree to “a drawing of a boundary line connecting the two extremities of the agreed Australian–Indonesian boundaries”.

The Timor Sea boundary dispute with Portugal escalated in January 1974 when a US company was issued an exploration permit to the median line, overlapping seven Australian permits.

Australia’s hard-line position continued even after a revolution in Portugal in April 1974 led to a new government that agreed to grant all Portuguese colonies independence. A further document from the time shows DFA again advised that Portuguese Timor would inevitably be incorporated into Indonesia, and warned not to let prospects for the settlement of Australia’s “seabed territory (and oil rights) dispute with the Portuguese” appear to colour Australia’s attitude.

The stakes were raised further when Woodside Petroleum struck oil and gas in the Greater Sunrise fields in mid 1974, very near the eastern end point of the 1972 treaty, and geologists advised the fields extended west into areas claimed by Portugal.

The diplomatic clash continued until Indonesia invaded Portuguese Timor in December 1975.

Australia’s decision to negotiate with Indonesia ahead of Portugal, leaving the Timor Gap between Australia and Portuguese Timor, coupled with the expectation Indonesia would close the gap with a straight line (unlike Portugal), gave Australia a multibillion-dollar interest in an Indonesian takeover of Portuguese Timor.

Category: Uncategorized (page 1 of 6)

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Fund-raiser SETL Sydney

Treaty confirms Aust profited from Timor-Leste oil and gas, rights groups say

How Australia crossed a line in the Timor Sea

How Australia crossed a line in the Timor Sea

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Category: Uncategorized (page 1 of 6)

Why The Trial Of ‘Witness K’ And Bernard Collaery Should Concern All Australians

What is the rule of law?

Equality before the law

Attorney General

IGIS

Public Service’s whistleblower laws

Absence of a federal integrity commission

Senate oversight

International Law

Human Rights

Right to Free speech

Client legal privilege

Right to a public trial

Timor-Leste activists ‘shocked’ by Australia’s prosecution of spy Witness K and lawyer

Witness K scandal: decision to charge Timor-Leste bugging whistleblower was ‘independent’

Witness K: ex-judge condemns prosecution of Timor-Leste bugging whistleblower

Timor-Leste bugging was our Watergate ­ except in this version, Nixon wins

Men who exposed Australia for spying on the Timor-Leste Cabinet during 2004 bilateral gas talks now face jail

Michael Sainsbury and Jose Belo, Dili Timor Leste June 29, 2018

Timor-Leste customer FAQs

How Australia crossed a line in the Timor Sea

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Timor-Leste bugging was our Watergate except in this version, Nixon wins

Michael Sainsbury and Jose Belo, Dili
Timor Leste June 29, 2018